

Presenting

The Truth About the War

The Truth About the War

By Major George A. Drew

An irrefutable answer to the slander, published in certain United States magazines, that in the Great War the British Empire shirked its responsibility

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

MAJOR GEORGE A. DREW

Ever since "The Truth About the War" appeared in MacLean's, Major George A. Drew has been one of the most discussed men in Canada. Born in Guelph in 1894, Major Drew was educated at Guelph public schools, Upper Canada College, the University of Toronto, and Osgoode Hall. In 1910 he started going to Petawawa with the 16th Battery. In 1914 he enlisted with the 16th Battery C.E.F. He was wounded in 1916 and was in hospital in France, England and Canada for more than a year. From the Fall of 1917 until the Spring of 1918, he commanded the 64th Battery at Guelph, when wounds necessitated his return to hospital until June, 1919. In 1920 he was called to the Bar, and until 1925 practised law at Guelph. For three years, 1922, 1923 and 1924, he was alderman, and the next year mayor of Guelph, being the youngest chief magistrate in Canada at that time. Then he was appointed Assistant Master of the Supreme Court at Osgoode Hall, Toronto. Since its reorganization after the war, he has commanded the 16th Battery at Guelph, a unit of the brigade which won the Shaughnessy Cup in 1927 and 1928 as the best militia artillery brigade in Canada.

The Truth About the War

To the slanderous statement, often reiterated in United States publications of a certain type, that the British Empire did not bear to the full the share of the brunt of battle, this plain statement of facts furnishes an irrefutable answer.

By MAJOR GEORGE A. DREW

Editor's Note—In presenting Major Drew's article it is not the intention of MacLean's to belittle in the slightest degree the part played by the United States in the Great War. Nor do either the author or MacLean's believe that the opinions expressed by the writers who are answered herewith reflect general public opinion in the United States. The point is that the United States periodicals to which references are made are widely circulated throughout Canada. They are read by a considerable proportion of the post-war generation. The perspective of that generation cannot but be affected by what it reads. And the absorption of misinformation concerning the part played by the British Empire from 1914 to 1918 must inevitably color that perspective unless countered by facts. This article is a plain statement of facts.—H. Napier Moore.

IN FEBRUARY of this year, the *Cosmopolitan* commenced a series of articles under the heading 'It's Time You Knew The Truth,' by Brigadier-General Henry J. Reilly. In the course of one of these articles, Brigadier-General Reilly tells us that the lack of Allied success on the Western front was due to the British

failure to enforce a draft law and their refusal to move their troops away from the Channel ports. This is but a sample of Brigadier-General Reilly's observations on the conduct of the British Empire during the World War, but it will serve to show the trend of his argument throughout the series.

An article under the suggestive heading, 'Who Won The War' appeared in *Liberty*, which told us that, 'a comparison by dates from entry into the war shows that we—the United States—put more troops more quickly in the face of the enemy than did the British, and that in the important last stages of the war we had more *facing the enemy* than they had.'

Garet Garrett, in *The Saturday Evening Post*, says almost the same thing. 'In the moment of declaring war we began to mobilize our fighting power. Eighteen months later we had *on the front against Germany* more men than any other nation, excepting only France.'

These statements are absolutely false and yet they are a fair and conservative sample of what is being produced for consumption by the readers of the United States periodical press. Unfortunately, we cannot ignore the fact that the thoughts and general information of a large percentage of Canadians are being subtly moulded through the medium of United States films and reading matter. Many Canadians scout the idea that people in this country pay any attention to such statements, believing that their palpable absurdity must impress any one who knows anything at all about the war. They forget, however, that the majority of those who read these articles and see the films know nothing whatever of the real facts of the war and that every year this majority will steadily increase. When one looks at it in that way, it is not comforting to realize that Canadians read a great many more United States periodicals than their own. It must be presumed that they read what they buy, and it is therefore a logical

conclusion that a very great percentage of what Canadians read concerning the Great War comes from such unreliable sources as have been quoted.

It is time that an earnest appeal be made to intelligent Canadians to face the flood of mis-statement which is pouring into this country, and to keep alive the truth concerning the Great War; not with any idea of belittling the really fine effort made by American soldiers after they did come into the war, nor for the purpose of glorifying ourselves, but only that the vital lessons of the war, which cost us so much in men and money, may not be lost, and that Canadians now and in the future may feel the justifiable pride in the knowledge of a task well done which should warm the heart of everyone who calls himself British.

Stephen Leacock, who people sometimes forget is Professor of Political Economy at McGill, in a recent address in Montreal deplored the effect of United States war films in Canada and said that unless it was counteracted children in Canada would grow up to believe that the United States was the only place where brave men were to be found and brave deeds done. In three recent pictures he had seen, the Great War had appeared as the Great American War. In his characteristic style he summarized his impressions. 'It was occasioned by a quarrel between Woodrow Wilson and a lot of nations living in Europe. Woodrow Wilson, whose only aim was to be good to everybody everywhere, found his efforts thwarted by a crowd of people in Europe. At last he declared war, invoking the blessing of God, of Abraham Lincoln, the Southern Confederacy and the Middle West.

'A vast American army invaded Europe. They first occupied France, where the French people supplied a comic element by selling cigarettes, waving flags and talking French, a ridiculous language, forming a joke in itself. Rushing through the woods, trenches, flames and trees, the Americans drove in front of them the Europeans.

'Exacting nothing in return, they went back to the Middle West, where they were met on the porch by their mother, the spirit of American democracy, and the inserted shade of Lincoln.'

This is a caustic but not unfair comment on the average United States war picture. It is almost equally applicable to many articles on the war, appearing in United States periodicals. It emphasizes the basic misconception of the cause of American participation that has grown up in the United States, and perhaps here, which has started much of their discussion of war effort on a wholly wrong hypothesis.

This sentimental viewpoint has not been confined to the civilian. Even Pershing had it in the back of his mind. The following appeared in his 'Order of the Day' issued to United States forces on August 27, 1918, to be read to all ranks.

'You came to the battlefield at a critical hour for the Allied cause. In almost four years the most formidable army the world has yet seen had pressed its invasion of France and stood threatening its capital. At no time has that army been more powerful and menacing than when, on July 15th, it struck again to destroy in one great battle the brave men opposed to it and to enforce its brutal will upon the world and civilization.

'Three days later, in conjunction with our Allies, you counter-attacked. The Allied armies gained a brilliant victory that marks the turning point of the war. You did more than to give the Allies the support to which, as a nation, our faith was pledged. *You proved that our altruism, our pacific spirit, and our sense of justice have not blunted our virility or our courage.*'

It may not have been intended, but it is difficult to escape the suggestion that American altruism and sense of justice was something so different than had been experienced before, that courage combined with it was

worthy of comment. Was their altruism and sense of justice greater than that of the brave French and British troops who, for three and a half years before the first American soldier reached the front, had been fighting and dying to prevent the same enemy from enforcing 'its brutal will upon the world and civilization?'

Even such a usually unsentimental civilian as Irvin Cobb, in the *Cosmopolitan* of March, 1927, said: 'The debt of Lafayette was paid—with compound interest—in the first week after the first overseas contingent of the A. E. F. landed on French soil.'

Why was the A.E.F. in France at all?

The American Declaration of War is an unsentimental document. In clear and succinct terms it sets forth once and for all why the United States declared war. It commences thus:

'Whereas the Imperial German Government has committed repeated acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America: Therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Government which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared.'

The wording is not susceptible to misinterpretation. There is no suggestion here of Uncle Sam entering the lists 'for the rights of nations great and small,' as Wilson expressed it.

U.S. Forced to Enter

THE United States entered the war because it was impossible for her to do otherwise. War was 'thrust upon the United States' by 'repeated acts of war' on the part of the German Government. Woodrow Wilson

in his address delivered at the joint session of the two Houses on April 2, 1917, summed up the situation in these words. 'We enter this war only where we are clearly forced into it because there are no other means of *defending* our rights.' He said in the same speech, referring to the German method of waging war, 'It is a war against all nations . . . There has been no discrimination. The challenge is to all mankind.'

When altruism, pacific spirit, and sense of justice are emphasized as national characteristics in entering the war, remember that the same challenge was issued to all mankind in August of 1914 as was accepted by the United States in 1917. What better evidence was there of Germany's intention, 'to enforce its brutal will upon the world and civilization,' than its demand upon Belgium to permit German troops to pass through Belgium to attack France? Remember also when national altruism is discussed, that Great Britain was not committed to enter the war in support of France. There is no doubt this impression exists in the United States and at least to some extent in Canada.

Germany declared war on Russia on August 1 and on France on August 3, yet on the morning of August 4, Britain was not only not at war with Germany but Sir Edward Grey sent the following message to the German Government, 'His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against the violation—the threatened invasion of Belgium—of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany.' It was only when Germany refused and in fact invaded Belgium that Great Britain declared war. The challenge to all mankind was in the breach of a solemn covenant which went to the very bedrock of international relations. The Hague Treaties guaranteeing Belgian neutrality had been signed by all the

Powers, including the United States. Germany's disregard of this inconvenient 'Scrap of Paper' and determination 'to enforce its brutal will' upon Belgium, declared to the whole world that Germany ignored every vestige of international law which makes civilization possible and recognized only one law, the law of the sword.

Theodore Roosevelt told Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, the British Ambassador at Washington, in October of 1914, that if he had been President in the last days of July he would have claimed the right of America as one of the signatories of the Hague Treaties to have Belgian neutrality respected. He believed the people of the United States would have been with him, and felt that a definite stand on their part might have prevented the war.* It is interesting to speculate on what the effect on history would have been of a message similar to that delivered on the morning of August 4, by Sir Edward Grey. If one can read the answer, there is a lesson of major importance to Canadians and Americans.

When we remember that the United States entered the war, not to pay any debt to Lafayette; not because of altruism, love of peace, or sense of justice, but because, in the words of Wilson, they were clearly forced into it by *repeated acts of war*, we realize that it was as much their war as our war, and that every sacrifice by any of the Allies which weakened the common enemy was as much a sacrifice in behalf of the United States as was any sacrifice of theirs a contribution to our cause. It was the same enemy, from August, 1914, to the end of the war, representing exactly the same principles which were ultimately as intolerable to the United States as to ourselves. Therefore, there is only

*Lord Charnwood, in his biography of Roosevelt, confirms this.

one logical method of measuring the share in the ultimate victory of any of the Allied nations and that is in terms of their total contribution throughout the whole war. Toward that victory every life lost, every shell fired, every dollar spent was at least as much of a contribution in 1914 as it was in 1918.

Adopting this logical method of comparison, it is worth while examining some of the statements which have recently appeared in what might be classed as the more responsible type of United States publications, which have a very large Canadian circulation.

Time You Knew the Truth

IN FEBRUARY of this year, as mentioned at the beginning of this article, the *Cosmopolitan* commenced a series of articles under the heading 'It's Time You Knew The Truth,' by Brigadier-General Henry J. Reilly. The following editorial comment appears above the first article: 'For ten years America has been waiting for someone to tell the Truth of our part in the World War. A year ago *Cosmopolitan* selected Brigadier-General Henry J. Reilly as the man best fitted to do this. He was sent abroad to go to original sources to sift out the facts from the mass of propaganda, exaggeration and half-truths.'

Now that is a fair method of approaching the question, and a Canadian naturally feels that facts presented in this impartial manner should be given due consideration. It is precisely this seemingly ingenuous method of approach which misleads, or is inclined to mislead, the majority of Canadian readers of such articles, who have neither the time nor the facilities to test the truth of the statements they contain.

The first of General Reilly's articles, written after he had sifted out the facts from the mass of propaganda, exaggeration and half-truths, contains the following information: 'When General Pershing landed in Europe

. . . the British had not yet adopted and enforced a real draft law to put all their available man-power in the army. Yet they had men to spare for expeditions to Greece and for a campaign in Turkey, neither of which could possibly win the war. The British thought only of protecting the French ports along the British Channel, these being on the shortest route to London from Germany. Their strategy consisted only in defending the ground they had or trying to get more ground in front of these ports. They had no idea of leaving this vicinity, no matter what arguments were advanced to prove that concentrations of troops on other parts of the Western Front would help whip the German Army. The Italians were only interested in their own narrow front along the mountains from Lake Garda to the Gulf of Venice. The French stretched like an overdrawn rubber band between the Italians anchored on the right and the British anchored on the left, with a much smaller proportion of soldiers and guns per mile of front than the British and Italians, they had to do the best they could to keep the Germans from taking advantage of the Allied lack of unity of effort and leadership.' And then Pershing came.

Perhaps you will say, "Well surely, every Canadian knows that this is not true." Are you so sure that even the majority of those Canadians who read the *Cosmopolitan*, really know whether it is true or not?

In the second article of the series, in March, General Reilly gives some of the fruit of his crusade for Truth by quoting an anonymous member of the German General Staff, chiefly in order to show what a very poor effort the British really made. As fiction it is interesting. A sample will do. 'Britain had always kept at home, and in 1916 and 1917 was still keeping a considerable force at home.' But General Reilly does quote his mysterious German officer in at least one statement with which we can agree, 'what does it all show above everything

else? Something very simple: that just as in a prize-fight, *a war is won only by fighting.'*

Having read these illustrations of what General Reilly has sorted out from the confused mass of propaganda and half-truths that have so far clouded the truth concerning the American part in the war, it is of interest perhaps to know what decided *Cosmopolitan* to choose General Reilly as the apostle of Truth. The editor says that it was just a year ago that *Cosmopolitan* selected Brigadier-General Henry J. Reilly as the man best fitted to tell the Truth after all this waiting. It is significant that it was just over a year ago that we first heard of General Reilly as a military critic when he contributed an article already mentioned entitled 'Who Won The War' to *Liberty*, another United States periodical with a fairly large Canadian circulation.

It is well worth while to recall some of the statements he made, not only that we may fully appreciate General Reilly, but in order that we may understand the qualifications which so strongly recommended him to *Cosmopolitan*. A few quotations will be sufficient.

'The more the records of America and Britain with respect to the Great War are examined and compared, the more evident it is that the British have no just grounds for criticizing us. Both nations have signally failed to profit by the lessons of their past military history. *If either is to make a criticism of the other as a result of the last war, we are the ones entitled to do it.*

'In August, 1915, one year after its declaration of war, Britain had 760,000 troops in France, or just about twice as many as we had one year after our declaration of war. However, one year and three months after her declaration she had but 950,000 as against 1,200,000 American troops there the same length of time after we had declared war. One year and five months after the respective declarations of war, the comparison is even

more in our favor, Britain having but 1,000,000 troops in France, as against our 1,750,000. A year and a half after the respective declarations, Britain had slightly more than 1,000,000 in France and 1,335,000 in all her theatres of war, as against our 2,000,000 in France.

'The day of the Armistice she had 1,860,000 in France, as against our 2,056,000.

'The failure of Britain to have a greater total in France was *due not to lack of troops, but to keeping large numbers at home.* At the time of our declaration, there were more than 1,400,000 British troops under arms in Britain. At the time of the successful German offensive against the British army in March, 1918, there were more than 1,200,000 in Britain. During the heavy fighting in July, 1918, this number had risen to more than 1,300,000. At the time of the heavy fighting in the Argonne in October this number had risen to 1,450,000. At the time of the Armistice it was more than 1,300,000.

'There is no better proof of how far the people of a nation really believe in that nation than the readiness and spirit which they display in furnishing men for war. The quick action of our Congress and the slow action of the British Parliament reflected the comparative willingness of the mass of the American and British people to fight for their country.'

Read that statement again and grasp what it means and then remember that it was read by hundreds of thousands of Canadians, many of whom were young children when the war ended.

Broadcasting Misinformation

GENERAL REILLY says, 'If either is to make a criticism of the other, we are the ones entitled to do it.' An examination of his articles reveals that their primary purpose is to compare British and American effort. Garet Garrett tells us that at the time of the

Armistice the Americans had more men on the front against Germany than any other nation, excepting only France. That statement appeared in *The Saturday Evening Post* which has a circulation of 3,000,000. General Reilly said precisely the same thing. Let us examine the facts. The contribution of each nation is no mystery; it is a matter of cold dispassionate record. The figures were fixed for all time at the end of the war. Neither ten years after nor one hundred years after can they be changed by any amount of research or subtlety of argument.

Let us deal first with the last statement, repeated so often by different writers to millions of Americans and hundreds of thousands of Canadians, that the Americans had more men facing the enemy than the British at the date of the Armistice.

The United States did not have more men 'on the front against Germany' than Britain and no one knows that better than any American officer who was in France. At the time of the Armistice the United States had 1,950,000 on their ration strength *in France* and the British had 1,718,000, but the United States did not have 1,950,000 *on the front* against Germany at that time. At the outset, the policy adopted by the American command was to send troops as quickly as possible to France to complete their training there, and less than 1,000,000 Americans were ready to go into action at the time of the Armistice. The British troops who were in the same state of training as more than half of the Americans who were in France, were still in England. Both principles were perfectly sound. As the men reached the point when they were ready to go into action, the British were sent to France to the combatant units as quickly as the Americans could be sent up from their training areas. It was the logical arrangement. If the number of effectives in the 'war zone' is to be considered, then let him add the British effectives in England who were preparing for service to

those at the front, because they were just as available for service as more than a million Americans back in their training areas. He says there were 1,300,000 at the time of the Armistice in England. Adding this number to those at the front would give the British in round figures 3,000,000 men as against 2,000,000 Americans immediately available for service. But that is not a very satisfactory basis of comparison. The only satisfactory basis is to compare the number of men that were actually fighting, for as General Reilly himself says, 'A war is won by fighting.'

The largest number of Americans engaged in battle at any time in the war was 896,000 and this included all combatant branches. This maximum was reached between September 26, 1918, and the Armistice, six weeks later, so that it will be seen that even that maximum number was engaged for a very short time, whereas the British troops actively engaged on the Western Front alone had been kept in the neighborhood of 1,750,000 throughout the year.

Let us carry this comparison of men engaged still further. In April, 1918, one year after the United States had declared war, when the British were bearing the brunt of the German hammer blows and Haig had issued his memorable message. 'With our backs to the wall and believing in the justice of our cause, each one of us must fight to the end,' the Americans had only four divisions fit for battle. During all the heavy fighting that followed until the German offensive collapsed at the end of June, only five American divisions were in the line, and of these only three were actively engaged. Much has been said of the American victory at Chateau Thierry, at the point of the salient formed by the German thrust on Paris between Soissons and Rheims, but, without detracting in any way from their effort, it is well to maintain a proper sense of proportion by remembering that only one American Division was engaged in that battle.

The Allies Had Won

WHEN the German offensive collapsed at the end of June the Allies had won the war, Germany had staked everything and lost. It might be six months, it might be a year, but the victory was won. From then until the first of August there were a number of local attacks under which the Germans retreated to the lines occupied when the Allies commenced their great drive on August 8. There was no more question of a German victory. They had exhausted their reserves and any possibility of a further attack on the scale necessary for success had disappeared with them.

Since we have been invited to make comparisons, let us see what the American contribution was up to the time that the tide of war turned finally in favor of the Allies. General Reilly, in his second article for *Cosmopolitan* in March, makes much of the statements of some mythical German general concerning the British effort. General Ludendorff, who was not unfavorable to the Americans, tells us, concerning the part they played up to the 1st of August, 1918, 'The six American divisions that had taken part in the battle had suffered most severely without achieving any successes. One division appears to have been broken up in order to bring them up to establishment. Notwithstanding the gallantry of the individual American soldier, the inferior quality of the American troops is proved by the fact that two brave German divisions were able to withstand the main attack made by very superior American forces for several weeks; and these two divisions, the fourth Ersatz and the 201st, I had up till then considered no better than the average.'

The British had borne the main force of the German attack, had suffered appalling casualties and considerable loss of material, but on August 1, they had sixty-one divisions engaged on the Western Front. The British do not suffer by a comparison at that date.

But General Reilly tells us 'that in the important last stages of the war we—the United States—had more men facing the enemy than they—the British—had.'

Is that true?

The Last Hundred Days, opening with the attack of the Canadian and Australian Divisions at Amiens, on August 8, may be taken as 'the important last stages of the war.' An unbroken series of Allied victories led up to the last phase which commenced on September 26. The battle from that date being one of continuous movement, September 25, is the last date for which there is an accurate record of the placing of the various divisions of the opposing forces. The official record, compiled from all sources on file with the Historical Section of the Department of National Defence, gives some intensely interesting information.

On September 25, the British Army had 62 divisions in action. They were opposed by 76 German divisions. The American Army comprised 21 American divisions and 8 French divisions, and the 29 American and French Divisions under Pershing were opposed by only 18 German divisions. It would seem from this that in spite of the American success at Saint Mihiel in the middle of September, Ludendorff had not yet become impressed with the fighting qualities of the American divisions, although paying full tribute to the individual bravery of their men. The Americans also had two divisions with the British and two with the Southern French Army of General Castelnau. Altogether, then, the British had 62 divisions 'in the face of the enemy' on September 25, 1918, as compared with 25 American divisions.

And now let us consider the situation on November 11. General Reilly tells us that on 'the day of the Armistice she—Britain—had 1,860,000 in France, as against our 2,056,000.' Garet Garrett, in *The Saturday Evening Post*, says that at the time of the Armistice the

United States 'had more men on the front against Germany than any other nation, excepting only France.' On November 11, the British still had 62 divisions in action. The Encylopaedia Britannica tells us that 'at the time of the Armistice the Americans had 32 divisions ready for battle.' Whether they were all engaged it does not say. No official record can be found of more than 25 being in action.

This is the Truth

THE truth is that at no time right up to the Armistice did the Americans have more than half as many men 'in the face of the enemy' as the British did in France alone. And remember, too, that up to the Armistice the British had suffered 3,679,264 casualties, as compared with 360,263 American casualties. And also do not forget that another British army had conquered Palestine and defeated the Turk; that another British army had advanced from Salonica against the Bulgarians and had been chiefly instrumental in their defeat; that they had also fought in Africa and were still fighting in Russia.

We have disposed of the gross misstatement that in the important last stages of the war the United States troops had more men facing the enemy than the British, whereas in fact most of the men being counted were still well back of the line in the training areas. But if a comparison is preferred even on the basis of men mobilized, the figures are still immensely in our favor. The United States with her draft law mobilized 4,165,483 while the British mobilized 8,654,280, most of whom were volunteers and most of whom saw active service. General Reilly declares, 'There is no better proof of how far the people of a nation really believe in that nation than the readiness and spirit which they display in furnishing men for war.' These figures speak for themselves. *A war is won by fighting.*

The American Army during the *whole* war captured 49,841 German prisoners, 833 Austrian prisoners and 850 guns. The British, in a period of little over three months from August 8th to November 11th, 1918, captured 187,000 prisoners and 2,850 guns, to say nothing of 29,000 machine-guns and 3,000 trench mortars.

There is no better evidence of fighting ability than in the number of enemy prisoners captured. The fact that the British captured nearly four times as many prisoners and guns in the last three months as the Americans captured in the *whole* war perhaps tells in the most graphic possible terms who really did the fighting. But that is not all. General Reilly does not tell us that in the campaign against Turkey which he criticised as a useless expedition, the British, in three weeks from September 18 to October 7, 1918, took 79,000 prisoners and the United States took 50,674 in the *whole* war. Were the efforts of Allenby and Lawrence of less use than those of more than a million non-combatant American soldiers in France? The answer is that Turkey surrendered.

'During 1917 to 1918, Britain's armies held the enemy in three continents and on six fronts, and cooperated with her Allies on two more fronts. Her dead, those 658,000 dead, lay by the Tigris, the Zambesi, the Aegean, and across the world to Flanders' fields. Between March 21 and April 17, 1918, the Germans in their drive used 127 divisions, and of these *102 were concentrated against the British.* That was in Flanders. Britain, at the same time she was fighting in Flanders, had also at various times shared in the fighting in Russia, Kiaochau, New Guinea, Samoa, Mesopotamia, Palestine, Egypt, the Sudan, Cameroons, Togoland, East Africa, South West Africa, Salonika, Aden, Persia and the Northwest frontier of India.'

These are the words of another American, Owen Wister, who found his Truth in the official records, not

in the mouths of unnamed officers of the German General Staff. Owen Wister tells us where Britain used her 8,654,280 fighting men. And yet we have been told that 'the British thought only of protecting the French ports along the British Channel, these being on the shortest route to London from Germany.' That is the sort of Truth about the British Army that nearly half a million Canadians have read. Why, even the epic story Wister has told in these few words omits at least one important contribution which shows how closely General Reilly has studied his facts. He apparently does not know that in 1917 five British Divisions went to Italy—more divisions than the U.S. had in action a year after they entered the war!

General Reilly tells us further that 'The failure of Britain to have a greater total in France was due not to the lack of troops, but to keeping large numbers at home' and continues with the amazing statement that, 'The quick action of our Congress and the slow action of the British Parliament reflected the comparative willingness of the mass of the American and British people to fight for their country.'

Once more let Owen Wister reply. 'Tell them that in May, 1918, England was sending men of fifty and boys of eighteen and a half, to the front; that in August, 1918, every third male available between those years was fighting; that eight and a half million men for army and navy were raised by the British Empire, of which Ireland's share was two and three-tenths per cent. Wales three and seven-tenths, Scotland's eight and three-tenths, and England's more than sixty per cent.; and that this, taken proportionately to our greater population would have amounted to about thirteen million Americans.'

And yet Canadians are told that if any criticism is to be made the people of the United States are the ones entitled to do it. Criticism of what? Certainly not of

the amount of fighting the British did! For once let us forget the tactful reticence Canadians ordinarily exhibit when the question of United States participation is raised by some of our American friends. The fact is that any comparison between the fighting of the British and United States Armies is manifestly absurd. Nearly four times as many prisoners taken in three months as the Americans captured in the whole war. Why, four Canadian divisions alone in those last three months captured 31,537 prisoners and 623 guns as compared with 50,691 prisoners and 850 guns captured by the Americans in the *whole* war.

What of Equipment

BUT perhaps the criticism is not of our fighting. It may possibly be directed against the equipment with which we fought. After all, guns, airplanes and tanks were of as vital importance as men toward the close of the War. What of the guns? Apart from the great naval guns mounted on railway trucks, and individual siege guns, the British at the time of the Armistice, after having lost thousands by shell fire during four years of war, had 6,993 guns of all calibres from the 18 pounder to the 15 inch Howitzer organized in batteries, while the Americans had 3,008. That does not seem a very large proportion of guns from the greatest industrial nation in the world, with all the wealth at her command to embark on an almost limitless production of the sinews of war. But the interesting fact is not the number of guns as compared with the British. It is the fact that so few of those were American guns. An authoritative work, entitled 'The American Army in the European Conflict,' by Colonel de Chambrun, tells us that 'Almost all artillery material and ammunition used by the Expeditionary Forces were procured in France and, to a much smaller extent, in Great Britain. *Only a few heavy guns and 109 seventy-five mm. were imported from the United States by November 11, 1918.*'

The argument is often advanced that the war did not last long enough for the United States to reach active production of war material. Remember this, that when the British declared war on August 4, 1914, their artillery consisted of 13 pounders, 18 pounders, 4.5 inch Howitzers and a few 60 pounders. They were faced with a much greater problem than the United States, because they had to make their plans for the production of new guns under the stress of supplying replacements for the guns they already had, a problem which the United States never was required to face. Yet it was only thirteen months after the declaration of war that Canadians heard the deadly symphony of the British guns at Loos, announcing to Germany in ceaseless thunder that British workshops were behind British men. A year and a half after the declaration of war, the British armies were equipped with a vast number of 8 in., 9.2 in., 12 in. and 15 in. Howitzers, production of all of which had been commenced after the war. A year and a half after the United States declared war the American army had received 'only a few heavy guns and 109 seventy-five m.m. of their own manufacture'. If the British had been that slow in supplying their artillery with guns there would have been no second year of war.

What of the air? Since the first successful flights of the Wright brothers, Americans had been pioneers in flying. Here we might reasonably expect to find them pre-eminent. Several factors pointed to this being the branch of the service in which most might be expected from them. Airplanes take a comparatively short time to build, once the plans are determined, and they had a great number of skilled flyers. When the United States declared war they had the advantage of all the British and French designs being placed immediately at their disposal. Here at least the British had no advantage over the Americans, because during the war the

last word in machines one month was almost obsolete the next. Yet what do we find?

At the date of the Armistice the British had in action on the Western Front alone 1,758 battle planes and the Americans 740. But figures covering the period of American participation tell more of the story. Up to the date of the Armistice, 6,364 airplanes were supplied to the American Expeditionary Force, half of which were instructional machines. Of these, 1,213 came from the United States, all the British De Haviland IV model; and the remainder were bought from France and Britain. Of these 1,213 American-made machines only 628 ever reached the front. As opposed to that, the British had 22,000 of their own machines in use at the date of the Armistice. The first American-made machine ready for active service arrived at Colombey-les-Belles on July 4, 1918, fifteen months after the United States declared war. The British had forty-eight machines at Mons fourteen days after they declared war.

The first American combat group appeared at the front in June of 1918. To this was transferred the famous Lafayette Escadrille, a squadron of Americans who had been distinguishing themselves with the French since before the United States declared war. The American Air Force during the whole war brought down 753 enemy planes. To compare only the period of active American participation, British airmen, *on the Western Front alone*, from June 1 to November 8, 1918 destroyed 1,837 enemy machines. In the year prior to that, from July 1917 to June 1918, the British brought down 4,102 enemy machines, or a total of 5,939 in a period commencing three months after the United States had declared war. During the whole war the British brought down considerably over 8,000 enemy planes as compared with 753 by the Americans.

Photography was a vitally important part of the work of the observation units. It was dangerous work.

It told the artillery where its targets lay and provided maps of the enemy defensive systems. During the war, American observation machines took 18,000 photographs. The British took 500,000. These figures only tell a small part of the story, but they show who did the fighting in the air.

Canada in the Air

CANADIANS have a particular interest in the record of the Royal Air Force. Thirteen thousand Canadians joined that branch of the service during the war and had a very considerable share of the 50,000 battles fought by British airmen. General Seely said in the British House of Commons, "It is in a large measure due to the splendid quality of the man-power of the Empire, of which Canada supplied so large a proportion, that Britain became master of the air, and has raised her air-power to a higher pitch than any of our Allies."

Tanks were the outstanding invention of the war. They were a British innovation of the greatest value. Ludendorff tells us that 'The best lines ultimately gave way before the tanks, which were able to overcome the greatest obstacles.' The tanks were comparatively simple to construct, and the United States, with its vast automobile factories, was in a peculiarly favorable position to turn them out in large numbers. As in the case of airplanes and guns, all the secret designs of the British and French were placed at the disposal of the United States. At least, in this case the British and French had no advantage because the tanks that had been made in the few months of their existence prior to the American declaration of war were more or less experimental.

What of the American tanks? The British Tank Corps had used this decisive engine of destruction to the limit of human endurance. From August 8 to the end

of the war they were in ninety-six days of almost continuous fighting, breaking one supposedly impregnable barrier after another, and in those ninety-six days two thousand machines were used. On the other hand, only three American tank units reached the battlefield and at the date of the Armistice their material on hand consisted of 36 heavy tanks and 208 light tanks. The 36 heavy tanks were British. The 208 light tanks were French. The *first* American tank reached France one month *after* the Armistice was signed.

The value of this British contribution to the cause of the Allies can be no better expressed than in the words of General Wrisberg in the German Reichstag while speaking for the Minister of War.

"The attack on August 8 between the Avre and the Ancre was not unexpected by our leaders. When nevertheless, the British succeeded in achieving a great success the reasons are to be sought in the massed employment of tanks and surprise under the protection of fog . . . The American armies should not terrify us. More momentous for us is the question of tanks."

With tanks, as with airplanes, artillery and infantry, *a war is won by fighting.*

Where, then, is the British effort to be criticised when compared with the American? Of the different fighting forces there is only the Navy left. Is it possible that it was the Navy General Reilly had in mind when he wrote 'If either is to make criticism of the other as the result of the last war, we are the ones entitled to do it.' There is nothing else unless it be in regard to money expended on the war, but that comparison would be too absurd even for General Reilly to consider.

What did the British Navy do? It made victory for the Allies possible. It bottled up the German High Seas Fleet which had cost her one billion five hundred million dollars, and the first time it dared open combat, that part of the British Navy that was in the North

Sea—for remember there were British squadrons all over the world—punished it so heavily that the German Navy remained bottled up for the rest of the war. Five million five hundred thousand tons of German shipping and one million tons of Austrian were captured or driven from the seas. Two million Germans of fighting age were prevented from returning home to fight. To do all this, British ships steamed as much as *eight million miles* in a single month. The British Navy made possible the supply by England of fifty per cent of the coal used by France for her railways and munition factories. It kept the seas open for British ships, which carried 130,000,000 tons of food and supplies for the Entente Allies and the United States. It transported by military sea transport:

Combatant personnel	23,388,000
Non-combatants	8,336,000
Animals	2,264,000
British Military Stores, tons	47,993,000

In carrying out this work, according to Lloyd's Register, the British lost in merchant shipping 7,923,023 tons from direct war causes. The United States lost 343,098. The British loss was 64 per cent of the total loss of the Allies, the Americans 3 per cent. The British Navy lost warships to the total of 550,000 tons. All the other Allies combined lost warships to the total of 253,000 tons and the United States lost none. The British Navy escorted half, and British transports carried sixty per cent of all American troops who reached France.

We have heard much of the intensive American anti-submarine campaign and have read and seen many pictures of the work of her submarine chasers. Those that got there did their work well. All credit to them. But it is well for Canadians to remember that in the submarine infested waters there were 5,000 anti-submarine craft operating day and night, and of these only 160 were American, or a total of 3 per cent.

The contribution of the American Navy was chiefly its work in escorting half of the United States troops to France. It maintained destroyer flotillas in European waters which assisted in escorting the American transports for the last six hundred miles. It also contributed one squadron of battleships under the command of Admiral Rodman to the Grand Fleet, but the Grand Fleet was never called upon to fight during the American participation in the war as Jutland had finished the fighting of the German surface ships once and for all.

Obviously, there is no comparison to be made. To answer the question of whether any criticism can be made of the British Navy a quotation from an article of Admiral Sims, who had command of the American Naval forces in European waters during the war, will suffice. 'Let us suppose for a moment that an earthquake, or some other great natural disturbance, had engulfed the British Fleet at Scapa Flow. The world would then have been at German's mercy, and all the destroyers the Allies could have put upon the sea would have availed them nothing, for the German battleships and battle cruisers could have sunk them or driven them into their ports. Then Allied commerce would have been the prey, not only of the submarines, which could have operated with the utmost freedom, but of the German surface craft as well. In a few weeks the British food supplies would have been exhausted. There would have been an early end to the soldiers and munitions which Britain was constantly sending to France. *The United States could have sent no forces to the Western Front,* and the result would have been the surrender which the Allies themselves, in the Spring of 1917, regarded as a not remote possibility. America would then have been compelled to face the German power alone, and to face it long before we had an opportunity to assemble our resources and equip our armies. The world was preserved from all these calamities because the destroyer and the convoy solved the

problem of the submarines, and because back of these agencies of victory lay Admiral Beatty's squadrons, holding at arm's length the German surface ships while these comparatively fragile craft were saving the liberties of the world.'

At sea, as on the land and in the air *a war is won by fighting.* The Grand Fleet which achieved the most complete naval domination in all history, comprised, on the day of the abject surrender of the German High Seas Fleet, two hundred and eighty-two warships, of all sizes. Of these, five were American, three French and the rest were British.

The facts and figures used are mostly from the respective official records and all are from authentic sources. On sea, on land, and in the air the story they tell is the same. Without attempting to go into details, they show what a silly and empty play on words is the statement by an American that 'If either is to make a criticism of the other as a result of the last War we are the ones entitled to do it.' They show how equally silly and meaningless is the claim that 'A comparison by dates from entry into the War shows that we—the United States—put more troops more quickly in the face of the enemy than did the British.'

Canadians and all other members of the British family will forever thrill at the recollection of the epic stand of 'The Old Contemptibles' at Mons *fourteen days* after the declaration of War. They were but one hundred thousand, it is true, but that was many more than the Americans had *in action* at the time of their first battle at Chateau Thierry, *fourteen months* after they declared War. And they show above everything else how little confidence should be inspired in Canadians by such seemingly guileless assurances of good faith as the editorial comment which introduced General Reilly's articles in the *Cosmopolitan.*

American achievement in science, medicine, commerce, and the arts, to say nothing of actual achieve-

ment in war, calls for our unqualified admiration, and thinking Canadians have ever been ready to praise, and to adopt the still higher flattery of imitating much that they have done. But when they have done so much which is really admirable, we can scarcely be accused of anti-American prejudice if we show our resentment of such wholly unnecessary exaggeration, particularly when the result of that exaggeration is a mischievous misrepresentation of British achievement to such a large proportion of the Canadian reading public.

There is no intention, in this recital of British achievement to glorify war. The figures quoted serve to impress on our minds more than anything else, that modern wars are not won by lofty sentiment alone, but by a colossal loss in human life and valuable material. Only an understanding of the truth of the last war in horror, misery and suffering, and some appreciation of what another war would mean with the intense post-war development in aircraft and mechanical transportation, will convince future generations how much peace is really worth.

Some Comparative Figures from Official Records

	British Empire	United States
Troops Mobilized	8,654,280	4,165,483
Total Casualties	3,679,264	360,263
Killed	x1,075,312	123,547
Divisions in Action Sept. 26, 1918	62	25
Enemy Divisions Opposing Them	76	14
Enemy Prisoners Captured During 1918	201,000	50,674
Guns Organized in Batteries at Armistice	6,993	3,008
Guns of Own Manufacture in Use	6,993	120
Battle Planes in Action at Armistice	1,758	740
Planes in Use	22,000	6,000
Planes of Own Manufacture in Use	22,000	1,213
Enemy Machines Destroyed	8,000	753
During Last 15 Months of War	5,939	753
Photographs Taken from Air	500,000	18,000
Tanks in Use at Armistice	2,000	244
Tanks of Own Manufacture in Use	2,000	0
Warships Lost in Action (tons)	550,000	xx10,000
Merchant Shipping Lost in War Service (tons)	7,923,023	343,098
Anti-Submarine Craft in Action	5,000	160

xIn the original article and "reprint" this table showed the number of British troops killed as 873,980. The librarian of the Imperial War Museum, London, advises us that the latest figure supplied by the Imperial War Graves Commission is 1,075,312. As the librarian suggests, the discrepancy was due to the fact that the author used an earlier post-Armistice official figure. The large addition is due to the number of men formerly posted as missing, but subsequently found to have been killed, died of wounds, etc.

xxThis is an approximate but outside figure. The only fighting ships lost by enemy action were—The Alcedo, a converted yacht; The Jacob Jones, a torpedo boat destroyer; and The San Diego, a light cruiser.

Where the Enemy Looked for the Fighting

ACCOMPANYING Major Drew's article in MacLean's Magazine, July 1, was a reproduction of a map prepared by the Historical Section of the Department of National Defence showing the disposition of the various Allied forces on the western front on September 25, 1918 It reveals clearly the following situation.

In all, on all fronts, some with the British and French armies there were twenty-five United States divisions and eight French divisions with the American army in action' faced by eighteen enemy divisions.

From the Belgian border to St. Quentin there were sixty-two British divisions in action. They were faced by seventy-six German divisions. In the salient south and a little to the west of Douai, almost midway between the cities of Douai and Cambrai, was the Second Canadian Division, the only Canadian division actually in the line on that date. Immediately back of it was the First Canadian Division in support. Facing the Second Canadian Division in the front line were five German divisions, and in support of those five German Divisions were another fourteen German Divisions. That is, opposed to the second and first Canadian Divisions we find nineteen enemy divisions. All of these enemy divisions were west of the city of Mons, and it is interesting to note that by November 11 all of these German Divisions had been defeated and many more, and the Canadians found themselves in that same city of Mons.

The massing of the German troops as shown on this map demonstrates emphatically where the enemy looked for the fighting.

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